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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Speedy Trial
The Three Term Rule
Petitioner was indicted for murder during the September 1966
term of the Summers County Circuit Court. Terms of Court fixed
by the statute provide for three terms of court each year in Summers
County, beginning in January, May and September.' The first in-
dictment was declared void at the January 1967 term of court,2 but
at the May 1967 term petitioner was re-indicted on the same murder
charge. The September 1967 and January 1968 terms passed with-
out Petitioner being brought to trial,3 and at a special term of court
in March 1968, the second indictment was declared void.' During
the May 1968 term Petitioner was again re-indicted for the same
murder, whereupon he filed a petition in the Supreme Court of West
Virginia for a writ of prohibition. Petitioner challenged the con-
tinuance of the prosecution on the grounds of the "three term" rule,
a statutory limitation on criminal prosecutions which provides that
"every person charged . . ., and remanded . .. for trial, shall be
forever discharged ... if there be three regular terms of such court
... after the . . . indictment is found .. .without a trial.' Held,
writ denied. When petitioner challenged the indictments, his chal-
lenge constituted a "motion at the instance of the accused" which
is a statutory exception' to the counting of terms in favor of the
discharge of the defendant. Further, since the indictments were
declared void, petitioner was never "remanded" for trial within the
'W. VA. CODE ch. 51, art. 2, §§ 1-1k (Michie 1966).
2In voiding the first indictment, the circuit court sustained the peti-
tioner's motion to quash the indictment and his plea in abatement, mo-
tions obviously initiated by the defendant, because there had been an im-
proper selection of the grand jury which had returned the indictment. State
ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1969).
3 Petitioner was not brought to trial during the Sept. 1967 term, be-
cause the court was still acting on various motions filed by him during
the May 1967 term. Petitioner was not brought to trial during the Jan-
uary 1968 term, because a heavy snow had prevented the attendance of a
sufficient number of petit jurors. State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169 S.E.2d
106, 110 (W. Va. 1969).
4 Id. As with the original indictment, this second indictment was de-
clared void when Petitioner's motion to quash the indictment was sus-
tained, because women had been intentionally excluded from the grandjury.
j W.VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, § 21 (Michie 1966) provides:
Every person charged by presentment or indictment with a felony
or misdemeanor, and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction
for trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the of-
fense, if there be three regular terms of such court after the pre-
sentment is made or the indictment is found against him, without
a trial ....
6 W.VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, § 21 (Michie 1966).
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meaning of the three term statute. State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer,
169 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1969).
The Farley case raises the issue of whether a criminal defendant
waives the protection of the three term rule by challenging the in-
dictments brought against him. Viewed in these terms, the defendant
faces a dilemma. He may be forced to waive one right (speedy
trial) in order to exercise another (the right to be tried pursuant to
a valid indictment). The West Virginia court avoided this dilemma
by confining its analysis to a mechanistic interpretation of the statu-
tory language.
Supported by impressive legal and historical authority, the right
of the individual to a speedy trial is securely rooted in Anglo-
American legal heritage.7 The sixth amendment to the Federal
Constitution guarantees to the accused in all criminal proceedings
the right to a speedy trial, and this guarantee has been made obliga-
tory on the states by Klopfer v. North Carolina.' West Virginia's
constitution provides a parallel guarantee9 which is implemented by
two different statutory provisions. One is the three term rule which
is directly involved in the present case. The other requires that the
accused be tried at the same term that the indictment is brought
unless good cause be shown for continuance."
7 "Its (speedy trial's] first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to
to have been in the Magna Carta... ; but evidence of recognition of the
right to speedy justice in even earlier times is found in the Assize of Clarendon
(1166)." Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). See
also 57 COLUM. L. Rnv. 846 n.6 (1957).
8 386 U.S. 213 (1967). There has been a difference of opinion as to
what provisions of the sixth amendment apply to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. For example, in 1942
the sixth amendment right to counsel was held not to be guaranteed to the
defendant in state proceedings. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
During the past decade however, there has been a growing tendency to
apply sixth amendment rights to the states; i.e., the right of counsel, Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); the right against self-incrimination,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1966); and the right to confront witnesses,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). And now the right to a speedy
trial has been extended to the states, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967).
9 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
'
0 W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1966), reads in part:
When an indictment is found in a court having jurisdiction, in any
county, against a person for a felony, the accused, if in custody, . . .
shall, unless good cause be shown for a continuance, be tried at the
same term.
See note 5, supra, for the relevant portions of the three term statute imple-
menting the state constitutional guarantee.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals avoided dealing with Farley in
a constitutional context, and in so doing it seems that distinct col-
lateral questions were left unresolved. For the purposes of defense
attorneys, there is still no certainty that the prosecutor cannot keep
initiating indictments irrespective of the three term statute, until one
is found to be valid. How much time, really, will be given to the state
to try a criminal defendant? Does such uncertainty put the de-
fendant's right to a speedy trial at the mercy of a potentially lethargic
government? The uncertainty is complicated even more when it is
seen that there is still no answer to the question: does the dismissal
of an indictment make those proceedings in which the indictment
was brought a nullity? If an indictment is later found void, can the
state continue initiating indictments until one is found valid? It does
not manifestly appear that either of these questions was directly
answered by the court.
I. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The three term rule in West Virginia includes both statutory
and judicial exceptions to its operation. Certain terms are not
counted toward the discharge of the defendant by express exception
in the statute.1 Extensive case law in West Virginia further inter-
prets which terms may be counted in favor of the defendant under
the three term statute. 2 The majority's analysis was a direct applica-
The statutory provisions for discharge are:
Unless the failure to try him [the defendant] was caused by his
insanity; or by the witnesses for the State being enticed or kept away,
or prevented from attending by sickness or inevitable accident; or
by a continuance granted on the motion of the accused; or by reason
of his escaping from jail, or failing to appear according to his rec-
ognizance, or the inability of the jury to agree in their vedict; . . .
then the defendant will be discharged from further prosecution.
W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, §21 (Michie 1966).S2 A partial list of those terms which cannot be counted in favor of the
discharge of the defendant under the three term statute are: the term
at which the indictment is returned, State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W. Va.
534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961); a term during which the defendant was out-
side the jurisdiction of the court, Id.; a term during which a writ of error
is pending, State v. Loveless, 142 W. Va. 809, 98 S.E.2d 773 (1957); a
special term of court, Dillion v. Tanner, 107 W. Va. 550, 149 S.E. 608(1929); a term at which the defendant procured a continuance at his own
motion, State v. McIntosh, 82 W. Va. 483, 96 S.E. 79 (1918); an adjourned
term, Denham v. Robinson, 72 W. Va. 243, 77 S.E. 970 (1913); and a
term during which the defendant failed to appear according to the terms of
his recognizance, Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 (1871).
A partial list of those terms which can be counted in favor of the dis-
charge of the defendant includes: a term, during which the trial court, through
inadvertence, failed to enter an order disclosing a continuance of the case
on the motion of the accused, State v. Underwood, 130 W. Va. 166, 43 S.E.2d
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tion of these statutory and judicial exceptions to the facts involved
in Farley.
First, the September 1966 term could not be counted in favor
of the petitioner because that was the term when the original in-
dictment was returned. 3 The January 1967 term was less sus-
ceptible to a clear application of the statutory provisions, as it was
during that term that the indictment was voided. To resolve this
issue against the defendant, the majority interpreted two statutory
exceptions against the petitioner. First, since the original indictment
was subsequently voided, "no pending presentment or indictment
upon which he [the petitioner] could have been tried, '"4 existed
during that term. Therefore the majority reasoned that the peti-
tioner had never been "remanded" for trial within the meaning of the
three term statute, and consequently he was not entitled to invoke
its provisions for discharge." State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry6 was
approvingly cited for the proposition that if the defendant is only
awaiting grand jury action he is not really being held for trial.1
A second statutory exception construed against the petitioner
was that since the petitioner had initiated a motion to quash and a
plea in abatement, these actions created "a continuance at the mo-
tion of the accused"-an exception to the counting of terms under
61 (1947); a term during which the defendant was serving a sentence in
the state penitentiary (counted only in relation to a different indictment
pending against him in the same court in which he was sentenced), Hol-
landsworth v. Godby, 93 W. Va. 543, 117 S.E. 369 (1923); a term during
which the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi if such was entered during the
third term, State v. Crawford, 83 W. Va. 556, 98 S.E. 615 (1919); and a
regular term at which no petit jury has been summoned, Ex parte Anderson,
81 W. Va. 171, 94 S.E. 31 (1917).
1 'The term at which the indictment is returned cannot be counted to-
ward the discharge of the defendant. State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146
W. Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961).14 State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169 S.E. 2d 106, 109 (W. Va. 1969).
Is Id.
16 146 W. Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961).
17 State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169 S.E.2d 106, 115 (W. Va. 1969).
The principle in DeBerry seems inapplicable, however, because even if it is
conceded that this is the correct rule of law, there were no terms during
which the petitioner was simply awaiting action by the grand jury. Further,
as Judge Haymond observed in his dissenting opinion, to hold that Farley
was never held for trial is to imply that a defendant must be held for a spe-
cific period of time during a particular term before he can claim that term
toward discharge under the provisions of the three term statute. Certainly
it cannot be argued that petitioner was not "held" for trial between the
time of his indictment during the September 1966 term and the time that the
indictment was voided in January 1967. State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169
S.E.2d 106, 119 (W. Va. 1969).
4
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the three term statute.18 Therefore, petitioner was not allowed to
count those terms during which he had made a motion to quash the
indictment. In support of this proposition, the majority reasoned
that: (1) the accused was responsible for the proceedings that
actually delayed the trial;19 (2) "the right to a speedy trial is not
violated by unavoidable delays nor by delays caused or requested
by defendants;"'" and (3) any motion which forces a continuance
will be treated as the equivalent of a formal motion for continuance
by the defendant, and thus the defendant will be charged with the
delay. 1 Therefore, up to and including the January 1967 term, the
majority counted no terms in favor of the petitioner.
The May 1967 term could not be counted toward the discharge
of the defendant because this was a term during which an indict-
ment (the second one) was returned." The regular terms of Septem-
ber 1967 and January 1968 could be counted toward the discharge
of the defendant, but the March 1968 term could not be counted
because it was a special term of court." The May 1968 term could
not be counted because that was when the third indictment was
brought.'" Following the logic of the majority, there were never
three terms of court to which petitioner could apply the three term
rule for a discharge from further prosecution.
18The defendant is discharged from further prosecution "unless the
failure to try him was caused. . . by a continuance granted on the motion
of the accused. . . . " W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, § 21 (Michie 1966).
19 If the defendant had not instigated any motions to quash the indictment,
however, he would have been tried under an illegal indictment.
20This quotation in Farley at 169 S.E.2d 106, 112 is taken from State v.
Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 50, 145 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1965), supporting
the view that the burden is on the accused to show that the delay in his
trial was caused by the negligence of the state, but West Virginia follows
the view that no demand for a speedy trial is necessary. See Ex parte
Chalfant, 81 W. Va. 93, 93 S.E. 1032 (1917).
"1 "If he [the defendant] instigates a proceeding which forces a contin-
uance of the case at a particular term of court, he will not be permitted
to take advantage of the delay thus occasioned." Ex parte Bracey, 82 W. Va.69, 75 95 S.E. 593, 596 (1918). Judge Haymond, dissenting in Farley, did
not so readily equate a motion to a proceeding, but reasoned that petitioner's
challenges to the indictments were merely incidental procedures which were
outside the scope of Bracey. State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169 S.E.2d 106,
121 (W. Va. 1969). But isn't the question of whether the continuance is
"forced" really a question of whether the judge and prosecutor act quickly
or lethargically? It is perhaps significant that the Bracey court did not attri-
bute to the defendant the delay caused by his challenge to the sufficiency of
the indictment brought against him. Ex parte Bracey, supra at 75.
"State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169 S.E.2d 106, 109 (W. Va. 1969).
23A special term of court cannot be counted toward the discharge
of the defendant. Dillion v. Tanner, 107 W. Va. 550, 149 S.E. 608 (1929).24 State ex rel. Farley v. Kramer, 169 S.E.2d 106, 109 (W. Va. 1969).
[Vol. 7 3
5
Swisher: Criminal Law--Speedy Trial--The Three Term Rule
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971
CASE COMMENTS
1". EFFECT OF THE HOLDING
A majority of jurisdictions hold that voiding an indictment makes
that proceeding a nullity.25 Therefore, to bring another indictment
is nothing more than to institute a new and independent proceeding,
to which the discharge statutes can be applied without any reference
to the first indictment. Although West Virginia has intimated that
it follows the minority view,26 the Farley decision follows the ma-
jority in practice, if not in so many words. This results from the
fact that if the defendant was never "remanded for trial," as the
majority reasons, then the three term statute would never run in his
favor. Therefore, the state could institute a new indictment at he
next term without reference to the original indictment proceedings.
Furthermore, if the term at which a defendant challenges the indict-
ment cannot be counted in favor of discharge, in theory the state
may continue to bring indictments until one is found to be valid.2"
The Farley case may also raise a serious constitutional question
as to whether a defendant, in order to exercise his constitutional
right to a speedy trial, must surrender his constitutional right to have
25 Jurisdictions which hold that the voiding of the original indictment
creates a new and independent proceeding with the bringing of a new indict-
ment include Ex parte Newell, 188 Cal. 508, 206 P. 61 (1922); Latson v.
State, 51 Del. 377, 146 A. 2d 597 (1958); State v. Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233,
386 P.2d 365 (1963); Greiman v. Dist. Court of Hancock County, 249 Iowa
333, 86 N.W.2d 819 (1957); State v. Bige, 195 Iowa 1342, 193 N.W. 17
(1923); State v. Rowland, 172 Kan. 224, 239 P.2d (1952); State v. Child, 44
Kan. 420, 24 P. 952 (1890); Greathouse v. State, 249 A.2d 207 (1969); State
v. Morton, 444 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1969); State v. Wigger, 196 Mo. 90, 93
S.W. 390 (1906) State v. Burlingame, 146 Mo. 207, 48 S.W. 72 (1898);
State v. McGowan 113 Mont. 591, 131 P.2d 262 (1942); State v. Robinson,
217 Ore. 612, 343 P.2d 886 (1959); Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 171
S.E.2d 243 (1969); Mealy v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 216, 68 S.E.2d 507(1952); Dulin v. Lillard, 91 Va. 718, 20 S.E. 821 (1895). See generally Annot.,
30 A.L.R.2d 466 (1953).26 State v. Crawford, 83 W.Va. 556, 98 S.E. 615 (1919), held that a
term of court at which a nolle prosequi was entered could be counted toward
discharge of the accused under the three-term rule. "When a prisoner has stood
ready for trial through two full terms and substantially through the third one,
and, no doubt, until the jury has been discharged and the opportunity for trial
at that term annihilated, he has substantially performed all the statutory con-
ditions requisite to his right of discharge ... ." Id. at 559, 98 S.E. 617. A
minority view is followed by those jurisdictions which hold that the state may
not extend the statutory period by dismissal. E.g., Dudham v. State, 9 Ga.
306 (1851); People v. Witt, 333 Ill. 258, 164 N.E. 682 (1928); Brooks v.
People, 88 Ill. 327 (1878); Smith v. State, 168 Tenn. 265, 77 S.W.2d 450
(1935).27 Such power placed in the hands of the state could perhaps lead to abuse,
since allowing the prosecutor to keep bringing indictments until one is found
to be valid could work to keep the defendant under indictment forever, if the
state so wished.
6
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the state return a valid indictment. Such analysis, however, is beyond
the scope of this comment.
A practical problem may also have been raised by the Farley
decision, in that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
now handed down an inflexible rule which leaves very little discretion
to the trial court in meeting individual situations. Such flexibility or
dscretion is problably desirable because an unreasonable or capri-
cious delay by the state has been held to be a denial of due process
under the fourteenth amendment.28
In summary it is submitted that the law in West Virginia, as
enunciated in Farley, is that if the defendant in a criminal proceeding
challenges the indictment brought against him, and that indictment
is declared void as a result, the defendant will not be allowed to
invoke the three term rule for that term or for those terms during
which he was awaiting re-indictment. But there are some unanswered
constitutional questions, as well as the open issue of whether the
trial court can discharge the defendant under the three term statute
where the prosecutor has acted in bad faith in bringing an indictment
which he knows will be voided.
Stephen P. Swisher
Statutes-Relation of an Enactment
to Its Title
J. Howard Myers, the petitioner, was charged by the grand
jury of the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County in six felony
indictments for conspiracy with others to affect the market, price and
supply of commodities and printing purchased and being purchased
by the State of West Virginia under the provisions of West Virginia
Code chapter 5A, article 3. Petitioner instituted a proceeding in
prohibition in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals seeking
to restrain respondents, George W. Wood, Judge of the Inter-
2 8 Justice Harlan would have decided the entire Klopfer case on the
basis of a denial of the process in the context of being a denial of fundamental
fairness. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1969). An unrea-
sonable delay has been held to be fundamentally unfair. Greathouse v. State,
249 A.2d 207 (Md. 1969). Isn't this the very essence of the provision in the
W. VA. CONST. art. nI, § 14, .y3hich provides that trial shall be without
unreasonable delay?
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